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In this paper we investigate the factors determining the choice of three exchange regimes using 
cross-country pooled data with the multinomial logit model.  We find that the traditional variables such as 
the size of the economy, exchange rate volatility, capital mobility, inflation, and openness increase the 
probability of a floating or intermediate regime, as expected.  Domestic policies, financial factors, adverse 
shocks to foreign variables (e.g., current account, foreign liabilities, reserves) also affect the choice of the 
exchange regime.   
 
Our findings show that there is no one-size-fits-all model for all regions.  Fundamental variables explain 
better regime changes in Europe and the CFA Franc countries, while financial and policy variables perform 
better regime choices in Latin America, East Asia and the Pacific area.  This result is consistent with the 
general perception that the currency crises that hit the international markets during the last two decades 
were fundamentals-driven in the case of Europe and Latin America but financial-driven in the case of the 
Asian crisis. 
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Key Words: exchange rate regimes, multinomial logit model, optimum currency area, currency 
crises. 
JEL Classification Numbers: F31, F33, F21. 
Introduction  
 
After the dollar crisis that led to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970’s, 
several industrial countries abandoned their fixed exchange rate regimes and shifted to floating 
rates.  Since then, the choice of the exchange rate regime has been the subject of a lively debate 
in international finance. To this day there is still no consensus over issues such as the optimal 
choice of regimes, their determinants, and whether regimes are sustainable or not.  In this study, 
we investigate the determinants of three exchange rate regimes (fixed, flexible and intermediate) 
and examine how regimes are chosen.   
Not surprisingly, a large volume of literature examines countries’ choice of exchange 
rate regime, which can be divided into two main groups: earlier studies and currency crises 
models.  The first group examines the systematic differences between float and peg countries.  
The analysis in this group of studies is closely related to the literature on the optimal currency 
area originated by Mundell (1961), and explains the regime changes with macroeconomic 
fundamentals.  The currency crises that occurred in the international financial market in the 
1980’s and 1990’s lead to a second development in the literature initiated by Krugman (1979). 
These models explain the currency collapse mainly with financial variables.
1   
  Although developed separately in time as a response to different questions, these two 
strands of the literature are closely related.  If a change in one of the independent variables 
raises the probability of a collapse of the currency, it also affects the probability of a change in 
the exchange regime.  In this paper, we use this correspondence to compare both the optimal 
currency area (OCA) and the currency crisis (CC) models and analyze the determinants of the 
choice of the currency regime with data from 138 countries.   
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold.  First, unlike the previous 
studies, which examined the choice between two exchange rate regimes, we use the multinomial 
logit model, and apply it to a cross-section data that spans the period 1982 to 1999.  This 
approach allows unordered choice between three exchange rate regimes and to our knowledge 
none of the previous studies applies this methodology for the exchange rate analyses and uses a 
data span as long as ours.  Second, to explore the differences in international monetary 
arrangements, we cover three different currency zones, the US dollar, the ECU/EMU, and the 
CFA Franc. Previous literature confines the analysis mainly to the US dollar zone. Third, we 
compare the two streams of the literature and examine the conditions under which a particular 
model is more useful at explaining the choice of exchange rate regimes.  Our approach provides 
a much richer framework for the analysis, and reveals interesting results.   
                                                 
1 See Edison and Melvin (1990) and LeBaron and McCulloch (2000) for reviews of these discussions. 
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flexible or intermediate regimes over a fixed regime increases with the traditional variables, such 
as the size of the economy, exchange rate volatility, capital mobility, inflation, and low openness.  
The results with the CC model, however, suggest that policy variables and financial factors also 
affect the choice of the exchange regime.  Adverse shocks to foreign factors, which deteriorate 
the current account, swell foreign liabilities, and reduce reserves, increase the probability of 
choosing the flexible or intermediate exchange regime over the fixed regime.  At the regional 
level, the OCA model performs better in Europe and Latin America, and the CC model explain 
better the regime changes in East Asia and the Pacific regions and in the CFA area.  This result 
is consistent with the general perception that the currency crises that hit the international markets 
during the last two decades were fundamentals-driven in the case of Europe and Latin America 
but financial-driven in the case of the Asian crisis. 
 
I.  A review of the variables 
Various studies used an array of dependent and independent variables to analyze the exchange 
rate regimes.  In the following section we survey the most common variables. We discuss two 
sets of explanatory variables that the previous studies relied on to estimate the probability of 
choosing a particular exchange regime.  We compare the explanatory variables from two 
approaches.  The first group of variables is drawn from the OCA discussion, and the second 
group is from the CC literature.    
 
1. Dependent variable   
Various methods and measures were used in the literature.  They range from a discriminant 
analysis (Heller, 1978), flexibility index (Holden, Holden, and Suss, 1979), to discrete variables.  
The latter consist of the following categories: two regimes with fixed and flexible rates (Dreyer, 
1978, Savvides, 1990, Bosco, 1987), three regimes with fixed, intermediate, and float (Bosco, 
1987), and four regimes with single-currency peg, basket peg, crawling peg and float (Melvin, 
1985).   
During the 1990s the studies on exchange rate regimes inquire the reasons behind the 
collapse of fixed exchange regimes and develop various crash measures.  Since our emphasis is 
on regime change rather than the crash itself, we will not elaborate on these measures.  
Interested readers may consult Frankel and Rose (1996), Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996), 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998).   
The IMF exchange rate classification (1983-1998) broadly divides the exchange rate 
regimes into four categories: fixed, flexibility limited (crawling peg), managed float (dirty float), 
and independent float.  For our dependent variable, we consider three regimes following 
  2Masson’s (2000) categorization, and define the two middle categories as an “intermediate” 
regime.
2   
 
2. Explanatory variables  
(i) OCA model  
These models emphasize the role of economic characteristics of a country in the determination of 
the choice of the exchange rate regimes (Heller, 1978, Dreyer, 1978, Holden, Holden, and Suss, 
1979, Bosco, 1987).  The most common variables used in these studies are: openness of the 
country, size of capital transactions, the economy size, patterns of international trade, inflation 
differential.   
Among the macroeconomic variables, the economy size is likely to be positively related 
to the degree of flexibility.  The smaller the economy, the more vulnerable it is to external 
shocks transmitted through the exchange rate, the higher the probability that it will opt for a low 
degree of flexibility of the regime (Heller, 1978).  Openness is negatively related to exchange 
rate flexibility, everything else being constant.  The more open an economy, the worse-off is the 
inflation-unemployment trade-off with a flexible exchange rate because of the ensuing 
depreciation of the currency, and the larger is the impact on the economy of a foreign shock 
(Rogoff, 1985).  Thus, the country will likely opt for a low degree of flexibility to circumvent 
the disadvantage of openness on inflation.  Finally, inflation differential is positively related to 
the degree of exchange rate flexibility.  A country with a relatively high inflation rate needs to 
adjust its fixed exchange rate frequently to remain competitive, which is likely to lead to the 
abandonment of the fixed regime in favor of a flexible one. 
Later studies also explore the effect on the regime choice of monetary and inflationary 
shocks, real exchange rate volatility, and financial integration, measured by capital flows.   
Variability of the real exchange rate is generally positively related to exchange rate flexibility.  
Higher variability is more likely to shift the country to the floating exchange regime, which is 
expected to offset the exchange rate volatility (Melvin, 1985 and Savvides, 1990). Capital 
mobility is likely to be positively related to the degree of flexibility.  Countries with high capital 
mobility and fixed exchange rates lose their monetary policy independence, hence their ability to 
conduct stabilization policies.  In the face of an adverse shock, countries tend to opt for flexible 
exchange rates to prevent a costly adjustment of the economy.  However, some analysts also 
argue that low capital mobility requires the trade account to adjust for international imbalances, 
                                                 
2 The latest IMF classification (1999) adopts a more detailed categorization of regimes: 1) Exchange 
arrangement with no separate legal tender, 2) Currency board arrangement, 3) Conventional pegged 
arrangement, 4) Pegged exchange rate within horizontal bands, 5) Crawling peg, 6) Crawling band, 7) 
Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate, 8) Independently floating.  In our 
analysis, we group regimes 1, 2, and 3 under “Fixed”, 4,5,6, and 7 under “Intermediate”, and 8 as “Float”.  
 
  3supporting the case for a flexible regime (Bosco, 1987).  If this argument holds, we would 
expect to find a negative relation between capital mobility and the probability of countries opting 
for a flexible regime.  The negative relation between high capital mobility and the flexibility of 
the exchange rate regime goes also back to the OCA discussion (Mundell, 1961).   
 
(ii) CC model 
The currency crises that occurred in the international financial markets during the 1980s and 
1990s led to new models that stress the currency collapses (Krugman, 1979, Obsteld, 1994, 
Chang and Velasco, 1998).  These models test the factors affecting the probability of a collapse 
of the exchange rate regime on country panels. They are constructed with different independent 
variables from the previous literature and include macroeconomic, external and foreign variables 
(Frankel and Rose, 1996, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996).  More recently, analyses also 
incorporate other financial variables such as return on equity market and the ratio of M2 money 
supply to banking reserves, contagion (Eliasson and Kreuter, 2001), while some include 
traditional variables such as exports and the real exchange rate, as early-warning indicators that 
predict the collapse (Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart, 1998).  
Among the macroeconomic variables, government spending, which is a proxy for fiscal 
policy, can have two opposing effects on the degree of flexibility of exchange rates.  The first 
effect leads to a positive relation.  A fiscal expansion increases expectations about the 
monetization of the debt, provokes crashes and thus forces the government to switch to higher 
flexibility.   Empirically, this view is supported by Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995) and 
Moreno (1995) but not by Frankel and Rose (1996).  The second effect is based on the simple 
Mundell-Fleming type of model.  Under perfect capital mobility, fiscal policy is effective only 
if the exchange rate is fixed.  Hence, governments that frequently rely on fiscal policy for 
economic stabilization will opt for a fixed exchange regime, suggesting a negative relation 
between public spending and the degree of flexibility.  Bank domestic credit measures the health 
of the banking system and is perceived by market participants as positively related to the degree 
of flexibility.  An expansion in bank credits increases the ratio of bad loans to good loans, which 
leads to speculative attacks on the currency (Sachs, Tornell, Velasco, 1996).  Alternatively, a 
high level of credits revive markets’ fear of a government bailout financed by printing money, 
followed by loss of central bank’s reserves and abandonment of fixed rates (Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999).  Economic growth, as a crude approximation for the political and economic 
cost in the government’s loss function, is expected to be negatively related to the degree of 
flexibility.  Economic recession can increase the probability of a currency crisis and encourage 
the government to switch to a higher degree of flexibility (Frankel and Rose, 1996).   
The two external variables, the current account balance and foreign reserves, are 
negatively correlated with the flexibility of the exchange rate.  A worsening in the current 
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collapse, trigger a currency crisis and force the country to adopt a high degree of flexibility.  
Short-term flows, such as portfolio investment and other investment, are volatile and thus 
considered to be destabilizing for fixed rates and positively related to the degree of flexibility.  
They are also associated with moral hazard in large amounts of international lending, which 
triggers massive capital outflows that lead to a currency crisis and the abandonment of the fixed 
rates (Radelet and Sachs, 1998, Chang and Velasco, 1998). The effect of FDI (foreign direct 
investment) on the exchange rate regime depends on whether it contributes to the stability or the 
volatility of capital flows and therefore is ambiguous. One view argues that because it entails 
ownership in domestic companies, FDI is a stable component of capital flows and does not 
fluctuate during economic and financial turbulence (Chuhan et al., 1994). Thus, higher inflows 
of FDI stabilize capital flows and help preserve fixed regimes.  An opposing view is that in a 
currency crisis, FDI is associated with a high variability of capital, which is reflected in 
increased transfers between the parent company and the subsidiary (Dooley et al., 1994).  The 
implication is that increase in the volatility of capital flows makes policy makers opt for a higher 
degree of flexibility.  The degree of overvaluation of the exchange rate, a measure of 
competitiveness, is positively related to the degree of flexibility. An overvalued exchange rate 
creates a high cost for maintaining fixed rates and therefore leads to its abandonment in favor of 
more flexible rates (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996). 
Foreign variables are negatively related to the degree of flexibility.  Many studies 
emphasize the importance of high foreign interest rates in affecting capital outflows and putting 
pressure on fixed exchange regimes and their eventual abandonment (Calvo et al., 1992, Chuhan 
et al., 1994, Fernandez-Arias, 1996).   A negative foreign economic growth (contraction) 
deteriorates the trade account, which can be overturned only by devaluing or floating the 
currency.   
 
II. Data and methodology 
1. Data   
All series are annual and cover the period 1982 to 1999.  The World Development Indicators is 
the main source for most of the independent variables.  Exceptions are the German GDP and 
PPP, which are from the OECD’s Statistical Databases and the weighted average of foreign GDP 
(OECD countries), from the OECD Statistical Compendium. Data for foreign liability and FDI 
comes from the International Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payment Statistics.  Data for the 
dependent variable, the exchange rate regime, are collected from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual Reports.   
We initially started with 200 countries that belong or used to belong to one of the three 
currency zones.  After excluding those with missing data, we ended up with 138 countries for 
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us a full sample size of 1749.  The categorization of currency zones is based on Yeyati and 
Sturzengger (1999), and the regional classifications of countries are from the World Bank 
development report (see appendix for the list of countries).  The explanatory variables, their 
symbols and definitions are as follows: 
OCA model:  The economy size (gdp) is the natural log of PPP based gross domestic 
product. The openness of the country (open) consists of the ratio of the import+export to the 
GDP.  The inflation differential (inf) is the difference between the gross domestic inflation and 
foreign inflation rates, both in natural logarithms.  The size of capital mobility (gcf) is the ratio 
of gross capital flows (assets plus liabilities) to GDP, and consists of FDI flows, portfolio 
investment and other flows.  Variability or volatility of the real exchange rate (rerv) is the 
standard deviation of the real exchange rate during the last five years, with the real exchange rate 
defined as the ratio of foreign price denominated in domestic currency to domestic price. 
CC Model: Government spending (gov) is defined as the GDP share of government 
final consumption expenditure.  Bank credit (bankc) consists of the domestic credit provided 
by banking sector as a share of GDP.   Economic growth (dgdp) is the year-over-year percentage 
change in per capita GDP.  Foreign reserves (rsv) are the ratio of gross international reserves to 
imports.  Gross reserves consist of holdings of monetary gold, special drawing rights, reserves 
of IMF members held by the IMF, and holdings of foreign exchange under the control of 
monetary authorities.  The current account balance is expressed as a ratio to GDP (cab) and 
short-term flows, or foreign liabilities (fliab) are expressed as the ratio of portfolio and other 
investments flows to exports.  Foreign direct investment is also defined as a ratio to exports 
(fdi).  Overvaluation of the exchange rate (dev) is the deviation from the last five-year average 
of the real exchange rate.  The last two foreign variables are foreign interest rate (intf) and 
foreign economic growth (dgdpf) calculated as the percentage change in foreign per capita real 
GDP. 
In the CC literature, foreign liability variables are commonly expressed as a ratio to 
GDP, external debt, or export.  Since there is no theoretical basis for such a decision, we 
examined the correlation matrix in an attempt to minimize the potential multicollinearity 
problem among capital flow variables, reserves and the current account.  Not surprisingly, the 
most significant correlation is between capital flows and the current account (Table 1).  
Normalizing with exports (first entry in each cell) reduces the correlation between FDI, the 
current account and reserves, while normalizing with GDP (second entry in each cell) decreases 
the correlation between short-term flows, fliab, and the current account.  We opted to use the 
export ratios because it reduces the correlation with foreign reserves substantially.   
  6 
Currency zones:  An important contribution of this paper is to cover three different 
currency zones: the US dollar, the ECU, and the CFA Franc currency zones.  Rather than 
limiting the analysis to a single zone like most of the previous literature does (US dollar 
zone), examining several zones could deepen further our understanding of exchange rate 
regimes.   
The foreign factors (world interest or inflation rate) that previous studies examine 
consist of the US variables or the OECD country averages. This methodology implicitly assumes 
the US or the OECD economy is the key external factor for most currencies.  However, a 
number of currency zones exist in the real world, and many currencies are adjusted to other 
currencies besides the US dollar.  In those cases, a country of an anchor currency is likely to 
have greater economic impact on member countries of the currency zone than the United States.  
With this logic, we compute each zone’s foreign variables (inflation differential, real exchange 
rate, foreign interest, and foreign economic growth) based on the anchor country’s variables.  
More specifically, for countries from the US dollar zone, the ECU zone, and the CFA Franc zone 
the foreign variables are based on, respectively, the US, German, and French variables.   
 
2. Methodology 
Previous studies used various statistical techniques to analyze the choice of the exchange rate 
regime.  Besides rare analyses based on OLS (Holden, Holden, and Suss, 1979), the 
methodology generally consists of discrete choice models: binary probit (Savvides, 1990, 
Frankel and Rose, 1990, Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1996), binary logit (Bosco, 1987), 
ordered probit (Dreyer, 1978), ordered logit (Melvin, 1985, Bosco, 1987, Eliasson and Kreuter, 
2001), and unordered multinomial logit (Bosco, 1987).   
The studies that are based on ordered choice assume that a country changes the degree 
of flexibility of the exchange rate regime sequentially, e.g., go from a fixed to intermediate and 
from intermediate to floating.  However, this assumption is at odds with the historical facts (e.g., 
the European experience).  This point is taken in Frankel (1999) and the evidence supporting 
the unordered choice is presented in Bosco (1987) and Masson (2000).  To check this point, we 
compared the ordered and unordered multinomial logit approaches for the OCA and CC models.  
We find that in both cases, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the pseudo-R
2 results 
support the unordered multinomial logit model over the ordered logit model (Table 2, top panel).   
We thus adopt a multivariate model with an unordered polychotomous dependent 
variable (Nerlove and Press, 1973), and estimate a multinomial logit model by pooling the data 
across countries and time periods.  We choose the fixed exchange regime as the base regime and 
the intermediate and the floating regimes as the first and the second categories. The 
contemporaneous interaction between economic fundamentals and the exchange rate regimes 
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economic fundamentals. 
The multinomial logit model is based on the “independence of irrelevant 
alternatives”, the IIA property, which assumes that the ratio of two probabilities is not 
affected by the other choices and that the choice of any two alternatives is independent from 
the others.  If this assumption were violated, the estimated coefficients would be biased.  
We use the Small-Hsiao procedure to test for the IIA assumption.
3   For both the OCA 
model, and the CC model, the respective  ,   values are smaller than their 
critical values at the 95% confidence level, suggesting that test results cannot reject the null 
of IIA, and that the estimators of the restricted and unrestricted sets do not differ 
significantly (Table 2, lower panel).  Thus, we can safely assume that the data have the IIA 
property for both models. 
) 6 (




III. Empirical results 
In the next subsections we examine the empirical evidence based on both models covering 
the period 1982 to 1999 (Tables 3 and 4).  In the first (middle) panel of each table, the base 
category is the fixed exchange rate regime and the figures indicate the probability of 
choosing between a fixed and floating (fixed and intermediate) regime when an 
independent variable changes.  Similarly, the third panel shows the probability of choosing 
a floating regime when the base category is an intermediate regime.  Figures in 
parentheses are the z-statistics associated with the estimates.   
The two goodness of fit measures, a LR test statistics distributed as (10) 
and (20) for each model respectively, and the pseudo-R
2 suggest that the models 
explanatory power is reasonable and compares well with the literature (e.g., the pseudo-R
2 
is about 0.20 in Frankel and Rose, 1996).  Comparing across models, AIC suggests that the 
OCA model in general outperforms the CC model in explaining the choice of the exchange 





1. The OCA model  
All of the independent variables are highly significant in the first category of fixed-float at 
the 95 % confidence level (Table 3, first column).  Three out of five variables, size, 
openness and inflation enter the regressions significantly across all regime changes.  
Consistent with the theory, the probability of choosing flexible over fixed exchange rate 
                                                 
3 An alternative procedure, the Hausman and McFadden test is not applicable in our case because our data set does 
not satisfy the convertibility condition for the covariance matrix.   
  8regime increases the larger is the economy, the less open it is, the higher the exchange rate 
volatility, the higher capital mobility, and the higher the relative inflation rate.   
Most variables affect the probability of the choice of an intermediate regime over a 
fixed one in the same way as floating over fixing (first column, middle panel).  All effects are 
significant at 95 % confidence level, except the variability of the overvalued exchange, which 
loses its statistical significance.  Openness has a distinct effect: an increase in the openness of a 
country increases the probability of choosing an intermediate regime.  This is quite intuitive: In 
contrast to the flexible regime, the intermediate regime can moderate the negative impact of the 
foreign shocks on the open economy, and it can adjust the trade imbalance more effectively than 
the fixed regime.  Because of these trade-offs, an open economy is more likely to favor the 
intermediate than the fixed regime.  
Results are somewhat mixed when we choose the intermediate regime as the base 
category (first column, third panel).  The effect on the probability of the choice of floating over 
an intermediate regime is consistent with the theory and the top panel for openness, capital flows, 
and volatility of the exchange rate.  The sign of the economy size, and inflation differential, 
however, is the opposite of the theory’s prediction.  Overall, inflation differential and country 
size are the most robust determinants of exchange regimes across regimes.  This result is 
consistent with the finding of Bosco (1987) where inflation differential is a significant variable 
that explains three different regimes, even though his analysis is conducted over three years 
during the 1980s. 
 
2. The CC model 
Independent variables, in general, have a high significance level in explaining the choice of 
floating regime (Table 4, column 1, first and middle panels).  In choosing floating over fixed 
regime, domestic factors enter the equations significantly and with the right sign (column 1, first 
panel).  An increase in domestic bank credits, and a decline in economic activity lead countries 
to prefer floating rather than fixed regime.  Higher government spending supports the 
hypothesis that a large government tends to adopt a fixed exchange rate.  Most of the foreign 
factors also enter significantly.  A deterioration of current account, a rise in foreign liabilities 
and a fall in reserves (not significant) lead a country to opt for floating regime, consistent with 
the theory.  An increase in foreign interest and growth rates, however, do not have the predicted 
sign.   
Most domestic and foreign variables are consistent with the theory when the choice is 
between fixed and intermediate regimes (first column, middle panel).  An decrease in 
government spending, an increase in bank credits, domestic growth, reserves, foreign liabilities, 
a deterioration of current account all lead to choosing the intermediate regime over the fixed 
regime.  When the choice is between intermediate and float, a smaller number of effects are 
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government spending, worsening of the current account, an increase in foreign liabilities make 
countries with an intermediate regime abandon it for a floating regime.  The other variables do 
not have the predicted sign by the theory. 
A further piece of evidence we obtain from these estimates is the relative importance of 
the independent variables in the choice of each regime.  In determining the choice between 
fixed and floating regimes, the current account, and the inflation differential; between fixed and 
intermediate regimes, the current account, foreign variables and domestic growth; between 
intermediate and floating regimes, foreign interest rates matter most.    
Interestingly, two variables, fdi and the overvaluation measure, have no significant 
effect in choosing any regime.  This comes as a surprise because these are variables that have an 
important role in the theoretical explanation of the currency crises.  In particular, fdi is long 
believed to be positively correlated with currency collapses.  One possibility is that the relevant 
variable should be fdi outflows, or net flows rather than inflows as we have in the analysis.  We 
conducted the analysis separately with each measure.  However, the significance of either 
measure was even weaker than that of the inflows, ruling out the measurement problem as a 
culprit.
4 
Another reason may be multicollinearity that makes the estimates inefficient.  The 
correlation matrix of variables shows that variables such as reserves, current account, foreign 
liabilities and fdi exhibit a moderate degree of correlation (Table 1).  To test this possibility, we 
regroup these variables, which are correlated and are believed to exert an influence on the choice 
of the exchange rate regime, and conduct a principal component analysis.  We use the first three 
principal components, which explain 89 percent of the variance of the variables (Table 5).  The 
components enter regression equations significantly in at least one of the panels (column 2, 
Table 4), where they are expressed as PC1, PC2 and PC3.  However, they do not affect the 
significance or the sign of the other estimates in either regime choice.  We also ran the 
regressions without current account and reserves, including one and not the other. None of these 
cases affected the significance of the fdi parameter.  We thus decided to continue with the 
original specification where the variables of the eigenvectors are estimated separately, since this 
specification offers the advantage of analyzing their effects explicitly.   
 
3. Regional models  
In this section, we check for changes in model coefficients across geographical regions: 
the ECU and Deutsche Mark region in Europe (EUR); the CFA Franc zone (CFA); and the two 
US dollar zones, the Latin American zone, comprised of South America and the Caribbean zone 
                                                 
4  This is not quite surprising since net flow figures are unreliable.  When the outflow figures are not available, 
the series contain inflows. 
  10(LAT) and the East Asian and the Pacific zone (EAP).  As before, we compare both the OCA 
and the CC models (Tables 3 and 4, last 4 columns in each panel).  The pseudo-R
2 is higher in 
most cases compared to the full sample.   
Our findings show that there is no one-size-fits-all model for all the areas. The OCA 
model is based on the fundamentals of the economy, while the CC model’s variables reflect the 
financial conditions in the economy.  Many researchers argue that currency regime changes in 
Latin America and Europe are caused by the deterioration of economic fundamentals, while 
currency crises in Asia stem from financial sources.  Our results are consistent with the 
common wisdom: the pseudo-R
2 and the AIC suggest that the OCA model performs better in 
explaining the choice of exchange rate regime in Europe and LAT, and the CC model in the EAP 
and the CFA countries.  For the CFA region, since the sample of floating exchange rate is 
nonexistent, both models only provide the estimates for the choice between fixed and 
intermediate regimes.   
The OCA model:  Country size, gdp, is a significant explanatory variable across 
regions and regimes.  Consistent with the theory, the larger the country size, the higher is the 
probability that the country will opt for a more flexible regime in all areas (Table 3, last 4 
columns in each panel).  Openness is an important factor in explaining the choice of the flexible 
regime in Europe and EAP region, and it significantly affects the choice between the fixed and 
intermediate regimes in LAT.  Financial integration, gfc, is not an important factor determining 
the exchange rate regime in LAT, but it significantly increases the probability of choosing the 
floating regime in both Europe and EAP areas.  Consistent with the theory, a high relative 
inflation moves both the LAT and the EAP region economies away from the fixed, towards a 
more flexible regime.  Not surprisingly, real exchange rate volatility is a significant determinant 
of the choice of exchange regime in Europe and LAT but not in EAP and the CFA areas.  As the 
sign suggests, economies experiencing high volatility in their currency value opt for a more 
flexible regime.   
At first glance, the estimated coefficients of two variables Europe are opposite to what 
the theory predicts.  An increase in inflation and decline in exchange rate volatility are 
associated with a move away from floating regime.  These signs, however, are consistent with 
the experience of the European countries.  Since the 1980s, anchoring currencies to the 
Deutsche mark, reputed for its anti-inflationary stance rate, successfully reduced inflation.  
During this process, convergence of the main economies towards a single currency required to 
satisfy the conditions to join the European Monetary Union leading to stabilization of exchange 
rates.     
The CC Model:  Although this framework does not perform too well for Europe, it has 
substantial explanatory power for the EAP and the CFA regions and several variables in the 
model shed light on the regional characteristics of the last two decades (Table 4, last 4 columns in 
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regime in LAT and CFA regions, and away from the intermediate regime in the EAP region.  It 
also has one of the largest coefficients, thus the largest impact on the determination of the regime 
in EAP.  However, fiscal policy has no role in the determination of exchange regimes in Europe.  
Monetary policy, represented by domestic bank credits, significantly affects the choice of 
exchange regimes in all regions, except LAT.  Higher bank credits increase the probability of 
governments opting for a more flexible regime in EU and CFA, and moving away from the 
intermediate regime in EAP.   
An increase in foreign liabilities raises the probability of a more flexible regime in all 
regions, albeit less significantly in Europe.  By contrast, large inflows of fdi significantly affect 
the choice of fixed regime in Europe and the choice from fixed to float in EAP, while it has no 
effect in other regions.  A decline in foreign reserves and deterioration of the current account 
significantly affect the choice of a more flexible regime over the fixed regime in EAP.  The 
influence of reserves and in particular the current account is less strong and the direction of the 
effect is less clear in other regions.  The foreign interest rate significantly affects the regimes in 
LA and EAP but the sign is not always consistent with the theory.  A decline in the EAP 
domestic growth rate increases the probability of governments opting for float.      
In summary, our findings reveal a complex picture about the experience of the LAT, in 
particular the EAP regions, and the currency crises that afflicted them in the past.  First, the 
traditional variables, such as loss of competitiveness, foreign reserves, foreign interest rates and 
growth influence the determination of the exchange rate regime in LA but not in the expected 
direction.  Second, a combination of domestic and foreign factors explains the shift away from 
the fixed regimes in the EAP region.  These are: a decline in FDI and a rise in foreign liabilities, 




In this paper we examine countries’ choice of exchange rate regimes with an unordered 
multinomial choice variable analysis.  We compare two types of model, the optimal currency 
area and the currency crisis models, and consider three different currency blocks, the US dollar, 
the ECU, and the CFA Franc.  Our methodology, data span and the comparison of the two 
models provide a rich framework that allows a detailed and original analysis of three exchange 
rate regimes.  
We find that over the full sample, the optimal currency area (OCA) models generally 
have a higher explanatory power the currency crisis (CC) models in explaining the choice of the 
exchange regime.  However, at the regional level, the OCA models, reflecting the economic 
fundamentals, perform better in Europe and Latin America, and the CC models, which reflect the 
  12effects of financial variables, perform better in East Asia and Pacific regions and in CFA area.  
This result is consistent with the general perception that the currency crises that hit the 
international markets during the last two decades were fundamentals-driven in the case of 
Europe and Latin America but financial-driven in the case of the Asian crisis. In each region, in 
turn, different variables affect the probability of choosing one regime over the other.  
The full-sample results with the OCA model reveal that the probability of choosing 
flexible or intermediate regimes over a fixed regime increases with the size of the economy, 
exchange rate volatility, capital mobility, and inflation, decreases with openness.  The results 
with the CC model suggest that domestic factors such as expansionary policies, recessions, and 
adverse foreign factors such as deterioration of the current account, a rise in foreign liabilities, 
fall in reserves increase the probability of choosing flexible or intermediate exchange regime.   
This is another remarkable result of our analysis supporting evidence against the two-pole 
hypothesis that argues that intermediate regimes are not viable.  A more formal treatment of this 
issue is the subject of another paper. 
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LAT: Latin America and the Caribbean 
Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas The, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uruguay, Venezuela RB,  
EAP: East Asia and the Pacific 
Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea Rep., Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand,  
Other regions 
Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Burundi, Canada, Egypt Arab Rep., 
Ethiopia, Gambia The, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iran Islamic Rep., 
Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lithuania¸ Malawi, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, 
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Uganda, Ukraine, Zambia, Zimbabwe,  
 
CFA Franc Zone 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Comoros, Congo Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo, 
Tunisia 
 
Europe: ECU and the DM zone 
Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Macedonia FYR, Malta, Moldova, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom 
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Table 1: Correlation matrix between regression variables and foreign variables* 
  gov bankcr  dpgdp rsv  Cab fliab  Fdi devav nint dpgdpf









































*The first entry in each cell is the correlation between a variable and fliab or fdi normalized with exports, 




Table 2: Multinomial Logit vs. Ordered Logit  
and Small-Hsiao Test of IIA* 
               Multinomial Logit                            Ordered Logit 
OCA AIC  1.682   1.787 
 Pseudo-R
2  0.192   0.137 
       
CC AIC  1.943   1.962 
  Pseudo-R
2  0.071   0.055 
                           Small-Hsiao Test                  
Base Category/Eliminated Category: Fixed/Intermediate      Fixed/Float    Intermediate/fixed 
OCA LL  -273.99840 -348.74733  -272.53839 
 LLR  -272.33044 -346.36598  -272.18655 
  χ
2(6)  3.336 4.763  0.704 
 P  0.7657 0.5746  0.9944 
       
CC LL  -305.88351 -461.77549  -270.97318 
 LLR  -296.76165 -  456.91623  -264.89424 
  χ
2(11)  18.244 9.719  12.158 
 P  0.0761 0.5559  0.3519 
------------------------------------- 
* LL is the log likelihood for weighted average of coefficients in two half-samples, and LLR is based on the 
restricted model.  P is the probability associated with the χ2 test.  The critical values at the 95% 
confidence level for 
2
is 12.95 for the OCA model and 19.68 for the CC model  χ
 








  Full 
Sample 
EU                      CFA LAT EAP Full
Sample
EU CFA LAT EAP Full
Sample
EU CFA LAT EAP
Fixed-Float  Fixed-Intermediate    Intermediate-Float
0.54**                  0.36* ---- 0.73** 0.31** 0.70** 0.73** 1.27 1.04** 0.74** -0.16** -0.37* ---- -0.3** -0.43** gdp 
(12.5)                            (1.7) ---- (5.0) (2.1) (18.1) (6.1) (5.3) (6.8) (5.2) (3.9) (1.8) ---- (2.5) (3.2)
-0.01**                    -0.08** ---- 0.01 -0.04** 0.01** 0.00 -0.01 0.02** 0.01** -0.01** -0.08** ---- -0.01 -0.05** open
(2.9)                            (4.6) ---- (1.3) (3.7) (3.9) (0.4) (0.8) (2.5) (2.3) (5.5) (4.7) ---- (1.3) (4.4)
0.03**                    -0.29** ---- 0.08** 0.14** 0.04** 0.01 0.11** 0.09** 0.12** -0.01** -0.3** ---- -0.01 0.03 Inf 
(5.4)                            (4.8) ---- (4.5) (3.2) (7.0) (1.3) (4.9) (4.9) (2.6) (2.0) (4.9) ---- (0.9) (1.1)
0.01**                      0.04** ---- 0.00 0.04** 0.01** -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 0.04** ---- 0.00 0.06** gcf 
(2.1)                            (3.4) ---- (0.1) (2.9) (2.3) (0.9) (0.7) (0.1) (1.2) (0.2) (4.1) ---- (0.1) (2.7)
1.05                          7.2** ---- 1.55* -0.67 0.33 -1.34 0.62 1.38* -0.26 0.72** 8.54** ---- 0.17 -0.4 rerv
(4.8)                            (5.2) ---- (1.9) (0.4) (1.5) (2.0) (0.7) (1.7) (0.2) (3.8) (5.8) ---- (0.3) (0.4)
-13.93                    -5.5 ---- -19.4 -5.71 -18.07 -17.72 -31.39 -26.87 -19.09 4.14 12.22 ---- 7.47 13.38 C 
(12.6)                            (0.9) ---- (5.2) (1.4) (18.3) (5.5) (5.6) (6.9) (5.1) (3.8) (2.1) ---- (2.3) (3.4)
LRT: 255.29 (Full Sample);  239.15 (Factor Analysis); 173.28 (EU);  92.24 (CFA);  265.97 (LAT); 100.90 (EAP) 
Pseudo-R
2:  0.071 (Full Sample); 0.066 (Factor Analysis); 0.098 (EU); 0.695 (CFA); 0.188 (LAT); 0.562 (EAP) 
AIC: 1.943 (Full Sample); 1.95 (Factor Analysis); 1.881 (EU); 0.428 (CFA); 1.757 (LAT); 1.178 (EAP) 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
a z-statistics in parenthesis;  *,** significant at the 10-percent and 5-percent levels, respectively.   LRT is the Likelihood Ratio Test distributed as . 
2 χ
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  Full 
Sample 
Factor 








Analysis EUR CFA LAT EAP
  Fixed-Float Fixed-Intermediate  Intermediate-Float 
-0.05**
*  -0.05**    0.04** ----        -0.18** -0.01 0.00 0.00    0.00 -0.71**  -0.09** -0.44** -0.05** -0.05** 0.04    ---- -0.10** 0.43** gov 
(4.3)                                (4.3)  (0.9) ---- (5.0) (0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.1) (4.3) (3.4) (4.7) (4.0) (3.9) (0.9) ---- (2.6) (4.6)
0.01**                                0.01** 0.02** ---- -0.01 0.01 0.01** 0.01** 0.00 0.26** 0.00 -0.02** 0.00** 0.00** 0.02** ---- -0.01 0.03 bnkc 
(5.7)                                    (5.9) (2.7) ---- (1.2) (1.2) (3.5) (3.7) (0.3) (5.0) (0.5) (2.8) (2.7) (2.9) (3.2) ---- (0.8) (3.9)
-0.04**                            -0.04** -0.20** ---- -0.03 -0.25** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.21** -0.06** -0.06** -0.21** ---- -0.05 -0.46 dgdp 
(3.0)  (2.9)  (3.4) ----                              (1.0) (3.2) (2.0) (2.1) (0.3) (0.8) (0.9) (2.9) (4.3) (4.3) (3.7) ---- (1.6) (5.4)
-0.04                    ---- -0.10  ----  0.15** -0.97** 0.06** ---- -0.11** -0.73** 0.13** -0.40** -0.10** ---- 0.01 ---- 0.02 -0.56 rsv 
(1.1)                                  ---- (1.0) ---- (2.5) (3.9) (2.5) ---- (2.0) (2.0) (2.5) (2.7) (3.0) ---- (0.1) ---- (0.4) (2.3)
0.07**                            ---- 0.05 ---- 0.03  0.25** 0.05** ---- 0.05* 0.02 0.02 0.16** 0.02** ---- -0.01 ---- 0.01 0.10 cab 
(6.1)                                    ---- (0.9) ---- (1.0) (3.7) (5.3) ---- (1.7) (0.2) (1.0) (2.4) (2.0) ---- (0.2) ---- (0.3) (1.3)
0.01                      ---- 0.02*  ----  0.02** 0.04* 0.00* ---- 0.01  0.07**  0.02** 0.00 0.00** ---- 0.01 ---- 0.00 0.04 fliab 
(3.8)**                                    ---- (1.9) ---- (2.3) (1.8) (1.8) ---- (0.9) (3.4) (2.8) (0.2) (2.2) ---- (1.4) ---- (0.0) (1.8)
0.01                        ---- -0.42*  ----  -0.02  -1.15** 0.03* ---- -0.32** 0.09 -0.02  -0.02 -0.01 ---- -0.10 ---- -0.01 -1.13 fdi 
(0.9)                                    ---- (1.8) ---- (0.6) (3.3) (1.7) ---- (2.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.4) (0.8) ---- (0.4) ---- (0.2) (3.3)
-0.07                          -0.06 -0.68 ----  1.78** -1.01 -0.13 -0.14 -0.40  4.86**  1.13** 0.53 0.06 0.07 -0.28 ---- 0.64 -1.54 dev 
(0.6)                                  (0.6) (0.9) ---- (3.6) (1.0) (1.4) (1.4) (1.1) (3.7) (2.7) (0.50) (0.5) (0.6) (0.4) ---- (1.5) (1.8)
-0.25**                        -0.25** 0.13 ---- -0.32** -0.37** -0.06** -0.06** 0.09 -0.32* -0.15** -0.06 -0.19** -0.19** 0.04 ---- -0.17** -0.30 intf 
(7.5)  (7.4)  (1.2)                            ---- (4.4) (3.1) (2.6)  (2.6)  (1.2) (1.7) (3.1) (0.7) (5.7) (5.6) (0.4) ---- (2.4) (2.5)
-0.09**                              -0.09** 0.00 ---- -0.16** -0.03 -0.06** -0.06** -0.03 0.09 -0.12** -0.18** -0.02 -0.02 0.03 ---- -0.05 0.15 dgdpf 
(3.8)  (3.7)  (0.0)                            ---- (3.0) (0.3) (3.7)  (3.7)  (0.7) (0.7) (2.9) (2.0) (1.0) (0.9) (0.5) ---- (0.9) (1.4)
2.52                                   2.17 -3.74 ---- 5.11 9.13 0.11 0.01 0.26 -2.70 2.22 9.51 2.41 2.16 -4.00 ---- 2.89 -0.39 C 
(6.3)                                    (5.6) (2.0) ---- (5.7) (4.2) (0.4) (0.0) (0.2) (1.0) (3.3) (4.8) (5.9) (5.5) (2.3) ---- (3.4) (0.2)
  0.06**                      0.06**  0.00  PC1 
  (4.7)                      (5.9)  (0.1) 
  -0.02                      0.03*  -0.05** PC2 
  (1.0)                      (1.8)  (2.7) 
  0.03                      0.07**  -0.04** PC3 
  (1.3)                      (4.0)  (2.0) 
LRT: 255.29 (Full Sample);  239.15 (Factor Analysis); 173.28 (EU);  92.24 (CFA);  265.97 (LAT); 100.90 (EAP) 
Pseudo-R
2:  0.071 (Full Sample); 0.066 (Factor Analysis); 0.098 (EU); 0.695 (CFA); 0.188 (LAT); 0.562 (EAP) 
AIC: 1.943 (Full Sample); 1.95 (Factor Analysis); 1.881 (EU); 0.428 (CFA); 1.757 (LAT); 1.178 (EAP) 




         T able 5: Principal Component  Analysis 
 
Component Eigenvalue    Difference  Proportion Cumulative
1  1.57        0.51 0.39 0.39
2  1.06        0.13 0.27 0.66
3  0.93        0.50 0.23 0.89
4  0.43         0.11 1.00
Eigenvectors 
   1        2 3 4
rsv  0.36        0.39 0.81 -0.26
cab  0.70        -0.05 -0.06 0.71
fliab  -0.39        -0.60 0.59 0.39
fdi  -0.48        0.70 0.05 0.53
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